7-minute read; Researched and edited with AI assistance.
Introductory Note from the CATR Team Leader: This is the third of five lessons, or takeaways, from our look at CA in large-scale combat operations using examples from WWII that began with CATR #28.
COL(R) DJC
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Takeaway #3: Senior leaders [of WWII] recognized that CA (civil affairs) and MG (military government) operations could become supported lines of effort during stability and occupation operations.
Except for the words in brackets and parentheses, inserted for anyone who hasn’t read the previous posts, the wording above is a direct lift from CATR #38 and is based on studying examples of CA and MG in WWII since CATR #28. If we update the language to reflect modern doctrine, Takeaway #3 is better phrased as:
Senior leaders of WWII recognized that stability operations increasingly became the supported line of effort in rear areas and after hostilities ended.
In a more recent vignette:
Beginning in December 2001, early in the Consolidation phase of the Afghanistan Campaign, CJTF-180 sought a framework to transition operations from Phase III (Dominate) to Phase IV (Stabilize). Civil affairs officers, including then-LTC Michael Stout, helped develop the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept, drawing on civil-military operations center (CMOC) doctrine and coalition stabilization planning. As the insurgency intensified and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations took precedence, coalition forces increasingly focused on fighting insurgents. Limited attached CA forces were frequently employed to procure supplies and projects that maneuver commanders used to secure short-term transactional arrangements with local elders in support of tactical objectives. Concurrently, but largely distinct from these tactical arrangements, PRTs supported the Afghan government’s reach and legitimacy by assisting local authorities, facilitating reconstruction projects, and linking security, governance, and development efforts, while coalition partners worked to build the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). By 2009, the civilian uplift and General Stanley McChrystal’s population-centric COIN strategy articulated in the U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan elevated governance, development, and other stability activities to major campaign lines of effort, recognizing that lasting progress depended as much on legitimate governance and population security as on defeating insurgents.
(Sources: Papers, reports, and interviews by Carlos Hernandorena, Maj. Cameron Sellers, Gen. Stanley McChrystal; Naval Postgraduate School; U.S. State Department; and the author’s observations as the leader of a Center for Army Lessons Learned team reviewing PRT operations in 2007 and a CJTF-82 staff member overseeing RC-East stability activities during the civilian uplift in 2009-2010.)
The lessons of WWII were rediscovered. The Army entered Afghanistan with a CA and MG doctrinal heritage rooted in WWII, but the campaign ultimately reaffirmed a lesson earlier wartime commanders recognized: as security conditions permit, governance, civil security, essential services, and development increasingly become supported activities, with combat forces operating in support of broader stabilization objectives.
The 1943 version of FM 27-5/OPNAV 50-3 defined civil affairs as follows:
“The term ‘civil affairs’ is used to describe the activities of the government of the occupied area and of the inhabitants of such an area except those of an organized military character. ‘Civil affairs control’ describes the supervision of the activities of civilians by an armed force, by military government, or otherwise. The term ‘civil affairs officers’ designates the military officers, who, under the military governor, are engaged in the control of civilians.” (p.1)
Thus, we could say that WWII doctrine effectively described “civil affairs” as all nonmilitary governmental and civilian activities in liberated and occupied territories. To ensure these activities did not interfere with military operations, CA officers assisted local authorities in meeting civilian needs during and after combat operations and in restoring civil security, governance, essential services, and economic activity, functions that largely correspond to today’s stability tasks. In occupied territories, CA officers were directly responsible for those activities under military government authority.
From Sicily to Berlin, and from Leyte to Okinawa, combat commanders directed combat forces conducting offensive and defensive operations, and CA and MG detachments conducting civil control activities in a supporting role during active combat. Once major combat ceased in local (rear) areas or at the end of the war, CA and MG efforts became the principal activity. Combat units were increasingly used in supporting roles to maintain security, enforce military government directives, provide constabulary functions, protect infrastructure, and support reconstruction and administration.
We call this stability operations today, and U.S. military doctrine outlines how and when operations, operations support, and sustainment forces execute stability tasks. The WWII military government function is now contained within the CA mission to establish and maintain transitional military authority.
Given the history of CA and MG in WWII, the rediscovery of lessons on command responsibility for conducting stability activities in rear areas where major combat has subsided and upon the final cessation of hostilities, and Army doctrine that has included stability operations since it first appeared as part of full spectrum operations in the June 2001 version of FM 3-0, Operations, one would think the Army and Marine Corps today routinely and equally train in offense, defense, and stability. However, in their recently published article, Better Stability Training Needed for Light Infantry, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James Dubik and Capt. Matthew Levengood noted that,
“History proves that the most likely mission for light infantry units is some form of stability operation. Yet, neither the Army’s operational doctrine nor its training methodology provides leaders with sufficient guidance to prepare for such missions. The Army designs and trains its light infantry forces primarily for large-scale combat but routinely uses them in stability operations.”
They later say,
“The transition from large-scale combat to stability historically has challenged Army leaders. Consolidating the major successes of the initial phases of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan proved difficult for some leaders in the transition from large-scale combat to stability and counterinsurgency […] It is concerning that units most often tasked with stability operations are not expected to maintain proficiency in them.”
I wholeheartedly agree with this assessment and share the concern.
The Afghanistan experience described in the vignette shows that stability operations – and the civil affairs capabilities that play a major role in them – should not be introduced as a secondary effort after security gains are achieved. Rather, as demonstrated in later WWII campaigns and relearned in Afghanistan, these capabilities must be integrated into campaign design from the outset to mitigate civilian harm and interference and to support host-nation legitimacy, governance, and essential services before insurgent networks can exploit governance gaps in areas transitioning out of combat.
To dive a little deeper, CA typically supports maneuver forces during major combat operations. However, as areas transition toward consolidation and stabilization, CA activities focused on governance, civil security, and civil administration may become the supported effort, with security forces and other capabilities enabling those efforts. Future campaigns require standing mechanisms to integrate security forces, civil authorities, development agencies, and coalition partners as areas transition toward consolidation and stabilization. These mechanisms already exist in CA doctrine and formations (though both need transformation to meet the operational requirements of the next LSCO). FM 3-57 outlines the following CA missions, which closely mirror those in our WWII examples:
- Conduct civil reconnaissance (CR).
- Conduct civil engagement (CE).
- Conduct civil network development (CND).
- Conduct civil information evaluation (CIE).
- Establish CMOCs.
- Provide support to civil administration (SCA).
- Establish and maintain transitional military authority (TMA).
Integrating these CA missions into offensive and defensive plans and operations requires maneuver commanders to have well-trained stability planners on their staffs and in attached CA units. These experts should be well-versed in WWII examples of CA and MG in sovereign and occupied territories and apply those costly lessons to broader, whole-of-government stability operations as a supported LOE, particularly for short-notice, unforeseen operations.
Adopting this solution should reduce the need to relearn this lesson late in the next operation and help translate tactical and operational security gains into durable political outcomes. Doing so can prevent hard-won military gains from evaporating after combat ends by enabling legitimate authorities to restore governance, provide essential services, and establish enduring political legitimacy without prolonged external military support.
Questions for our teammates: Do you agree or disagree with Takeaway #3 and my interpretation of the lesson? Do you have any observations of CA in LSCO from your experience in named operations, training events, or exercises you’d like to share?
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