6-minute read; Researched and edited with AI assistance.
As the Cold War and post-Cold War periods show, U.S. combat forces can find themselves in high- or low-intensity conflict in any theater at any time. In the next few posts, we review the five main takeaways from civil affairs (CA) and military government (MG) operations in WWII, as listed at the end of CATR #38. As you read them, consider how these lessons apply to military operations across the competition continuum, not just to large-scale combat operations (LSCO).
Each takeaway opens with a vignette from a later military operation that shows whether the lessons of WWII were learned or not. (We’ll see that some were, some were not, and some were repeatedly rediscovered – often at high cost.) We then propose operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) for maneuver commanders and CA professionals across all theaters as they prepare for and fight the next LSCO. Across the case studies, one theme recurs: the most successful operations integrated CA capabilities early enough to shape the civil environment and consolidate gains, rather than treating CA as an afterthought.
Takeaway #1: Understanding and Shaping the Civil Environment is fundamental to sustaining operational success and consolidating military gains.
In a more recent vignette:
When I was in Baghdad in May 2003 as a member of the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group, the capital experienced frequent power outages. I was told that when the first outages occurred after U.S. combat forces transitioned to a stability role, a senior commander asked, “Did we do that?” After checking, his staff informed him that the power grid was fragile and that outages had been common before the war.
Later, in Mosul, the occupying division commander explained that when his division was reassigned to secure Mosul and the Nineveh Governorate, his unit had neither maps of the area nor knowledge of its political structure, social dynamics, or economic activities.
A U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) General Purpose CA Battalion arrived a few days after the division entered Mosul, but it was neither large enough nor properly organized to manage Iraq’s third-largest city. Like other CA forces in Iraq, it had not prepared to operate in that specific urban environment, as CA and MG detachments had during WWII. As a result, the commander relied on members of his academic network and task-organized division and brigade staffs to engage local populations and build the understanding required to stabilize the area.
(Sources: Author’s observations and interviews in Baghdad and Mosul, Iraq, May-June 2003.)
The lessons of WWII were not learned. The lack of prewar civil preparation left commanders in Iraq to learn basic facts about local governance, infrastructure, and society during operations rather than beforehand.
U.S. military commanders have relied on intelligence to understand an enemy’s location, capabilities, disposition, and likely courses of action since the founding of the Continental Army over 250 years ago. As in our WWII examples, the Iraq experience shows once again that commanders cannot effectively plan combat, stability, or transition activities without first understanding the normal conditions, key actors, governance structures, infrastructure, economic systems, and social dynamics of the civil environment. Just as intelligence preparation of the battlefield informs understanding of enemy forces, civil preparation of the environment provides the foundation for understanding the population and institutions operating within an area of operations (AO).
Civil affairs forces are trained to study and understand the historical, pre-war, and current conditions of their assigned AO. In today’s global security environment, Geographic Combatant Commanders employ active and reserve component civil affairs forces from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve to conduct peacetime CA operations worldwide. They train partner CA and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) forces, address combatant commanders’ critical information requirements (CCIR) related to the civil environment, and conduct other set-the-theater activities to help commanders understand and influence the civilian environment while supporting crisis response and theater security cooperation objectives.
During transitions to crisis and open hostilities, deployed CA forces routinely track, assess, and document changes in conditions affecting populations in the target AO. They conduct civil reconnaissance and assessments not to collect random information on a generic checklist but to provide commanders with answers to CCIR that inform operational decision-making. Providing commanders with the same level of understanding of the civil environment that intelligence preparation provides for the enemy gives them a decision advantage. Just as intelligence helps commanders anticipate enemy actions, civil information helps them anticipate civilian reactions to military operations, identify unintended consequences, and recognize opportunities to gain and maintain popular support.
Once combat operations begin, CA forces refine their initial assessments through targeted civil reconnaissance and on-the-ground civil engagement. Tracking changing conditions as combat operations progress informs planning for branches and sequels, including logistics planning to support initial emergency humanitarian assistance, acquiring host nation resources to replace or augment military capabilities, and conducting simultaneous stability operations in rear areas as combat operations continue forward. This is also important when responding to civilian harm incidents and adjudicating damage claims by local citizens following combat actions.
Early-deploying special operations CA forces operate in the deep area, while direct-support conventional CA forces move with lead maneuver formations in the close area. As rear areas are established, additional CA forces should be organized into CA task forces (CATFs) that integrate U.S. and partner-nation capabilities, including medical, engineering, military police, and security forces. As with the MG detachment in Munich, these CATFs should be assigned to pre-designated and pre-studied geographic locations to establish stability, maintain economy of force, and enable maneuver formations to continue offensive operations.
Information gathered across all three areas should flow through the established civil-military information-sharing architecture to specially trained CA professionals in higher-level CA units. These professionals combine operational experience with advanced analytical tools to interpret conditions, anticipate likely civilian responses, and inform the common intelligence and operating pictures. They then recommend OAIs for CA, maneuver, and support forces, as well as for civilian mission partners. These OAIs are designed to influence the civil environment and create effects in the rear, close, and deep areas that protect civilians and civilian objects and support the commander’s interim and end-state objectives. This process should continue throughout LSCO until combat forces close on their final objectives and consolidate their gains.
I say all this to reinforce that understanding the civil environment is not a supporting activity performed after combat begins; it is a foundational requirement for campaign design. Commanders who lack baseline knowledge of the population, governance systems, infrastructure, and economy of their AO risk making decisions based on incomplete or inaccurate understanding, whereas those with timely civil information gain a significant advantage in planning, execution, and consolidation.
The lesson from Iraq, as from WWII, is that commanders who enter an AO without understanding its people, institutions, and systems must learn in combat, often at a high operational cost.
Questions for our teammates: Do you agree or disagree with Takeaway #1 and my interpretation of the lesson? Do you have any observations of CA in LSCO from your experience in named operations, training events, or exercises you’d like to share?
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