3-minute read; Researched and edited with AI assistance.
Introductory Note from the CATR Team Leader: This is the second of five lessons, or takeaways, from our look at CA in large-scale combat operations using examples from WWII that began with CATR #28.
COL(R) DJC
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Takeaway #2: CA operations as a supporting line of effort (LOE) in offense and defense operations.
During the second battle of Fallujah in November-December 2004, CA Marines assigned to Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 1, including then-Major Leonard J. DeFrancisci, supported combat operations through a range of population-focused initiatives. Leveraging local networks and using what Maj. DeFrancisci later described as “Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN,” they sought to separate the civilian population from the insurgency by reducing the insurgents’ recruiting pool, addressing local grievances, and facilitating the evacuation of civilians from the impending urban battlefield. Civil affairs personnel also enabled a combined U.S.-Iraqi response to flooding that impeded mobility during combat operations. Following the battle, they helped consolidate battlefield gains through reconstruction, economic recovery, and governance support, translating military success into lasting stability.
The lessons of WWII were learned. In LSCO, CA operations should not be treated as a post-conflict function. As their CA and MG predecessors did on Leyte, Luzon, and Okinawa, the CA Marines of RCT-1 were integrated into offensive and defensive planning from the outset. Employed in direct support of maneuver forces, they shaped the civil environment, reduced friction caused by civilian populations and infrastructure disruptions, and helped translate battlefield success into enduring operational and strategic outcomes.
As we noted in CATR #34, “Offense, defense, and stability operations are inherent elements of conventional and irregular warfare” (FM 3-0, p. 9, para 1-44). When one is the main effort, the others are supporting efforts. During WWII, CA and MG forces conducted stability activities in support of offensive and defensive operations. From the D-Day landings in Normandy to the end of the war in the European and Pacific Theaters, successful CA and MG (i.e., stability) activities were planned and resourced in advance and synchronized with maneuver operations.
In the next LSCO, offense, defense, and stability will again occur simultaneously, and CA operations will be essential to integrating stability activities with offensive and defensive operations. When stability is the supporting effort, CA forces in direct support roles, along with enablers in general support CATFs, will enable maneuver forces to achieve campaign objectives.
The Fallujah experience, as with our WWII examples, demonstrates that CA operations support offensive and defensive operations by shaping human terrain before, during, and after combat. By engaging local leaders and populations, establishing and maintaining civil networks, and identifying and leveraging the information, capabilities, and resources those networks provide, CA forces extend a commander’s operational reach beyond military boundaries. Helping commanders address civilian needs and maintain the support of key populations strengthens the legitimacy of military operations and creates the conditions needed to consolidate battlefield gains and transition to stability in rear areas where major combat has subsided. They do so by:
- Reducing civilian interference with military operations by facilitating civilian protection, movement, and essential support.
- Separating civilian populations from enemy influence and reducing opportunities for adversary recruitment.
- Supporting freedom of movement and maneuver through planning, coordinating, and overseeing control of the populace and resources.
- Providing civil input into intelligence collection, targeting, and operational planning.
- Identifying host nation capabilities, infrastructure, and resources that sustain combat power and support operations.
- Mitigating instability, infrastructure disruptions, and humanitarian crises that could hinder military operations.
- Establishing conditions for rapid transition to governance, recovery, and stability activities as combat operations wind down.
CA forces also provide commanders with nonlethal means to influence the civil environment, address local grievances, incentivize cooperation, and reduce support for hostile actors. A key lesson from Fallujah is that CA forces do not merely respond to the effects of combat; they actively enable offensive and defensive operations by shaping civilian behavior, mitigating disruptions to the operational environment, and helping commanders translate battlefield success into enduring gains.
Questions for our teammates: Do you agree or disagree with Takeaway #2 and my interpretation of the lesson? Do you have any observations of CA in LSCO from your experience in named operations, training events, or exercises you’d like to share?
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