10-minute read
By Colonel (Ret.) Lars Skinner
With contributions by Major General (Ret.) Hugh van Roosen, Colonel (Ret.) Dennis J. Cahill, Colonel (Ret.) Bradford Hughes, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Albert Augustine, Major Jack Gaines, and Major (Ret.) Tom Kinton.
Introductory Note from the Team Chief: This question came up while discussing another post with a teammate. We posed it to other members of the Team Room and received some interesting tips and feedback. COL (Ret.) Skinner stepped up to pull the various threads together with some of his own experience to create this week’s post.
COL DJC
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The Challenge.
When referring to U.S. and Allied operations in Iraq and Afghanistan a few years back, it was often said, “We haven’t been there for 20 years – we’ve been there for one year, 20 times.” This captures the struggle many of us faced downrange to build capabilities and sustain them from one rotation to the next, along with the incremental gains in the areas where we were deployed. One aspect of this challenge is maintaining civil networks both during and after a deployment.
There are two clear ways to maintain relationships with networks developed downrange for a long-term mission: either transfer the network to a follow-on team or stay in personal contact with key individuals in the network after redeployment. As will be discussed below, both approaches face significant challenges.
Doctrine.
FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, states that civil network development and engagement (CNDE) is one of the four core competencies within the civil affairs (CA) branch and is the process “by which civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations.” CNDE provides commanders with a more complete understanding of the operational environment, particularly the civil component, and how the use of networks can help shape operational outcomes. Benefits of effective CNDE include enabling freedom of movement and maneuver, augmenting limited military resources, and preserving combat power. CNDE also gives a commander options to find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component, such as impacted critical infrastructure, special purpose or proxy enemy forces, criminal entities, or other disruptors.
Operationalizing CNDE is not easy.
Few would argue against the benefits of building and maintaining an effective civil network. Yet there are many challenges to doing so. Probably the most obvious one is the limited time that CA staff spend in a particular region during most deployments. The standard deployment during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom was about nine months to one year in-country. While this seemed a long time for those deployed, it is but a moment for those living there, and the fact that one CA unit is replaced by another CA unit does not resonate with many cultures. The people who live there build a relationship with you, not your unit or branch. I once spoke with some British mission partners in Kabul who told me that UK forces in Iraq had shorter, 6-month tours, but they would often return to the same place on subsequent rotations. This allowed them to build on existing relationships and minimize the effects of shorter deployments.
It is also worth noting that the U.S. government’s four-year election cycle often forces a “factory reset,” making long-term planning and achieving the end state a Sisyphean task at best. Decoupling major campaigns and operations from the election cycle would likely require revisiting Goldwater-Nichols and many other foundational policies and regulations – something beyond most of our pay grades (especially those of us in retirement).
Building civil networks (as well as many other aspects of civil affairs work) is affected by gaps or tensions between what may be a geographic combatant command’s (GCC’s) theater security cooperation plan (TSCP) and the country engagement plan of a U.S. ambassador and country team. Particularly in countries outside of an active combat zone, if the Chief of Mission hasn’t bought into whatever networks you’re building, it’s probably not going to happen. A similar fate befalls those CA staff who work for a commander focused solely on measures of performance (MOP) rather than measures of effectiveness (MOE). Networks often do not deliver short-term, quick, easy-to-quantify “wins” that satisfy reporting on MOPs. The presence of an effective civil network could itself be considered an MOE, but only if CA staff have the resources (including time) to build it.
Similarly, in a theater area of responsibility (AOR) experiencing combat operations, it can be challenging to get a commander focused on anything besides “putting warheads on foreheads.” Kinetic operations are “sexier” and easier to brief up the chain than building influence, engaging local leaders, and conducting (for example) MEDCAPs and VETCAPs. During my last deployment to the Horn of Africa (HOA), the main topic was always about killing Al-Shabaab insurgents in Somalia. A laudable goal, to be sure. But 1) that’s not the main function of CA Soldiers, and 2) Somalia was only one country out of nine in our AOR (as defined at the time by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-HOA command staff).
According to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency guidance, “Contact with individuals of any foreign nationality, either within or outside the scope of your official duties” is a reportable item for all Soldiers regardless of whether they have a security clearance. For that reason alone, it is best to have an effective transfer between outgoing and incoming units to continue building or maintaining a strong civil network that provides information, capabilities, and resources for military operations in the AOR. Both active component (AC) and USAR CA units benefit from establishing standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the structures and processes used to maintain networks. Unit maintenance of contacts is also preferred to individual CA staff trying to continue liaison with foreign nationals on their own once a deployment ends.
Another challenge is posed by changes to the types of annual training and engagements with host nations available to most CA units. When I was in the 426th Civil Affairs Battalion (Special Operations) and 478th CA Battalion (Foreign Internal Defense/ Unconventional Warfare) – both designed to directly support special operations forces – we participated in Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) missions, which used to occur regularly, providing opportunities for special operations units to build relationships and networks within the same countries and regions every year. Since 2006, with the reassignment of USAR CA Forces to the U.S. Army Reserve Command as conventional forces, JCETs are no longer open to them. Today’s conventional CA force has an operational tempo and deployment cycle that rarely sends the same people, or even the same units, back-to-back to the same locations, posing real challenges to building capacity and sustaining civil networks.
One of the first places to look for ideas about building and maintaining networks should be those who know the AOR best – namely coalition and local national military staff attached to the deployed headquarters. These subject matter experts are often ignored or become an after-thought when planning and executing CA missions. In my year-long tour at CJTF-HOA, we had 5-7 African Soldiers embedded in the J9 shop, and yet I almost never saw them consulted on operations in their own country or asked for input for planning a mission.
Solutions.
Given the time required to build an effective network, and the challenge of selecting MOEs to assess its effectiveness, CA staff should aggressively manage expectations with their commanders (e.g., under-promise and over-deliver). Networks are not built in a day, nor are their effects and payoffs always seen as quickly as commanders may desire.
CA Officers embedded in a GCC (whether in the J3, J5, or J9) should provide input to inform any revisions or updates to the TSCP during their assignment, including a line of effort that addresses building and maintaining effective civil networks. For example, they may want to consider including JCET-like training opportunities in that line of effort that support training partner nation government officials and security forces in emergency management best practices using 12304b mobilization authority. This would involve not only creating “positive” networks, but could also involve countering networks that operate in illicit trade and other activities that threaten civil security or host nation national defense.
During GWOT, CA forces operated at all echelons but were most effective at the maneuver and support brigade level. In general, from my observations, those that operated at the corps and division levels – particularly in Afghanistan – were less effective for reasons beyond the scope of this blog post. But since these are the levels that will lead and fight a near-peer conventional conflict, we need to build networks within our own forces to create support for and appreciation of the CA mission and skill set.
Considering the challenges discussed above, we should not overlook the role of coalition partners, or even non-governmental organization (NGO) staff, in a civil-military operations center in the effort to build and maintain civil networks. NGO staff often work in a specific AOR for years at a time, providing much longer continuity with locals than U.S. military staff. Granted, they have priorities other than ours, but since civil networks are about relationships as much as anything else, NGOs can be a bridge for CA staff between unit rotations (provided we can overcome the frequent distrust that some NGOs have for the military).
It should also be noted that, for many of the countries and civil networks that CA Soldiers work with, the people of the host nation see us as representatives of and ambassadors for democratic values. This perception is even more important now that the U.S. Agency for International Development has been largely eliminated, weakening a key part of U.S. soft power and leaving many smaller countries (and NGOs) feeling abandoned.
Deployed CA units often have personnel who get reassigned to other jobs or depart early for a variety of reasons, further complicating efforts to maintain relationships and networks. Units should track the key leaders in their assigned AOR to sustain those relationships. A CA unit preparing to deploy should maintain a running estimate focused on networks and key nodes or people in the specific country or region to which it is deploying. This way, if the relief-in-place with the unit it’s replacing is inadequate or cut short, the incoming unit arrives with a solid understanding of the area, including its civil networks.
When working with partner nation forces, CA staff should seek out their partner nation counterpart units. Some partner nations, like the Republic of South Korea, have CA forces within their Armies. Others, like those in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have civil-military coordination (CIMIC) units. Countries in other regions may not have either, but CA Soldiers assigned to those regions must learn which partner nation units have a CA focus. Military leaders understand the importance of partnering with Allied or Coalition forces. If you can’t clearly articulate your relationship to partner units that support or impact civil-military operations, commanders may question the value of your presence in their AOR.
When a unit is maintaining contact with networks for rotational mission purposes, it is worth mentioning “how” it might do this. Social media has had a major impact (mostly positive) on staying connected to civil networks overseas. WhatsApp and Signal are preferred since they are end-to-end encrypted. Other social media platforms (e.g., Facebook) pose risks to both users and missions if adversaries monitor their posts.
The Civil Affairs Corps could consider strengthening connections with Foreign Service Officers, including involving USAR CA staff during periods when they are between orders or deployments. Foreign Service staff could potentially help maintain networks since they are typically assigned to an embassy or consulate assignment for a longer duration (2-4 years on average) than CA Soldiers are in the country. This could serve as a potential model for the process to preserve a network and transfer oversight when necessary.
Lastly, while this is likely to have only an indirect effect, CA Soldiers’ access to the Foreign Area Officer program should be expanded. The “AFPAK Hands” program concept should be expanded to AFRICOM and INDOPACOM, to enhance CA Soldiers’ ability to engage with and build networks with locals in a region. Expansion to INDOPACOM has been considered before.
Questions for our teammates: Do you have any feedback for or questions about today’s response? How would you answer the original question about networking?
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Lars Skinner
Colonel (Retired) Lars Skinner began his military career in 1983 as an AH-1W pilot in the U.S. Marine Corps. After a break in service, he joined the U.S. Army Reserve, serving as a Civil Affairs and Medical Service Corps officer with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. He retired from the Army in 2020 after 28 years of service and retired in 2026 from his civilian career as well. He enjoys traveling the world with his wife, refining his abilities as a mixologist, and weighing in on current events in his capacity as a life-long curmudgeon.