15-minute read
The original question.
In September 2025, in response to CATR #13, Major John McElligott sent the Civil Affairs Team the following questions: Do you think the [special operations forces] SOF CA units today need to remain SOF to accomplish their assigned missions? Could you describe for readers the authorities that SOF status can unlock for those CA units? The answers to these questions are part of a broader discussion about the difference between AC SOF and USAR conventional force (CF) CA forces, and whether non-SOF CA forces can conduct SOF CA missions, a topic of ongoing debate within the CA community.
I’m going to address this broader question while also responding to MAJ McElligott’s original inquiry. In this post, I will focus on U.S. Army CA forces and, as I usually do, include references to U.S. legislation, Department of War (DoW) policy, and joint and Army doctrine related to the topic. I invite other experienced members of both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps CA forces to share their perspectives.
What does U.S. law say?
As mentioned in CATR #13, Title 10 U.S. Code § 167 – Unified combatant command for special operations forces established the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987. Paragraph (j) defines what constitutes SOF, and paragraph (k) identifies civil affairs as a special operations activity “insofar as it relates to special operations.”
Paragraph (a) of Title 10 U.S.C. § 322 – Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign forces, grants the Secretary of War the authority to cover expenses related to deploying and training SOF assigned to USSOCOM “in conjunction with training, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country,” as well as “the incremental expenses incurred by [a friendly developing] country as the direct result of that training.” Paragraph (d)(1) clarifies that “The term ‘special operations forces’ includes civil affairs forces” assigned to USSOCOM.
From what I can tell, Title 10 is silent on civil affairs insofar as it relates to conventional operations, and there is no CF equivalent to 10 USC 322.
What does DoW policy say?
[NOTE: The terms DoW and DoD will be used interchangeably in the following paragraphs until the current DoD publications are updated to reflect the recent name change.]
Paragraph 2.c. on page 26 of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, reiterates USSOCOM’s Title 10 responsibility “to conduct, in addition to those specified, all affairs of such command relating to special operations activities, including…(1)(i) civil affairs operations (CAO).” Paragraph 4.b. on pages 34-35 lists “(4) Conduct CAO,” and “(6) Occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority” as functions of the Army. Meanwhile, paragraph 5.c. includes “(6) Conduct security and stability operations and assist with the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority” as a function of the Marine Corps.
DoDD 2000.13, Civil Affairs, details DoW policy regarding its requirement to “maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of civil affairs operations necessary to support DoD missions and to meet DoD Component responsibilities to the civilian sector in the operational environment across the range of military operations,” or ROMO. It also explains what constitutes civil affairs operations, how DoW CA capabilities may be used in domestic operations, and how CA forces are integrated with other military forces to work alongside host nation agencies and other unified action partners in civil-military operations (CMO). Enclosure 2, pages 6-9, outlines the shared responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army and the USSOCOM commander to recruit, organize, train, equip, mobilize, and sustain Army civil affairs forces.
[NOTE: A new version of DoDD 2000.13 is currently being staffed and reviewed within the Pentagon. Until it is officially published, the 2014 version at the link provided above remains in effect.]
Neither DoDD 5100.01 nor DoDD 2000.13 differentiates between SOF and CF CA operations. However, DoDD 2000.13 states that the Commander, USSOCOM, “Trains and organizes assigned civil affairs forces, and monitors their readiness to carry out assigned missions of special operation forces.”
What do joint and Army doctrine say?
Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Joint Civil-Military Operations, was updated and published on 2 April 2025. Unlike its predecessors, this version “(r)emoves considerations to civil affairs throughout” (iii). However, it briefly notes that Army CA forces typically coordinate activities to help joint force commanders “employ CMO at the tactical level to consolidate gains, reinforce local authority, and mitigate civilian harm and civilian interference in military operations” (I-6).
The latest version of JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, published on 12 May 2025, offers little additional clarity beyond listing CAO as an activity assigned to SOF under 10 USC 167. The description of CAO on page II-12 is vague and does not specify a special operations-specific CA capability that differs from a conventional CA capability.
We finally begin to find information on the difference between AC SOF CA forces and USAR CF CA forces when we get to U.S. Army doctrine. The primary references here are Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations; ATP 3-57.80, Army Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs; and FM 3-05, Army Special Operations.
With some help from a large language model to read and summarize the relevant passages in each manual, we find that Army doctrine states the main difference between special operations and conventional CA forces is in their organizational structures, mission focus, and operational environments. The SOF CA forces of the 95th CA Brigade (Special Operations)(Airborne) ((SO)(A)) are AC units specifically assigned to support special operations commanders and missions. They operate globally in complex, high-risk environments, often engaging with civil networks and conducting civil-military integration to support irregular warfare, operational preparation of the environment, and crisis response. These forces offer region-specific expertise, including cultural and language skills, and are built for rapid deployment to support expeditionary and crisis-response operations. In contrast, USAR CF CA forces concentrate on broader CMO in more stable environments and often support larger-scale Army or joint operations. While both forces share core competencies, SOF CA forces are specially trained and equipped to operate in austere, contested, or politically sensitive environments alongside other SOF.
What does the Army’s CA training program say?
Unlike the Army’s special forces (SF) branch, which requires candidates from all components to attend the same assessment and selection process and resident training program, the CA branch has separate training programs for the active and reserve components (RC, including the USAR and Army National Guard (ARNG)). All AC CA candidates – both officers and enlisted personnel—participate in a nine-day Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection (CAAS) process. Those who are selected return for the remaining portion of either a 74-week CA SOF Governance Officer (38S) course, a 54-week Civil Reconnaissance Sergeant (38R) course, or a 92-week CA Medical Sergeant (38W) course.
RC CA Soldiers do not attend CAAS. RC CA officers (38A) attend a Captains Career Course (CCC), which includes a distance learning component followed by a 29-day resident course. Enlisted Soldiers assessed into the USAR branch undergo 10 weeks of Basic Combat Training (BCT), followed by 10½ weeks of CA Specialist (38B) Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Later in their non-commissioned officer (NCO) careers, they attend the 3-week CA Specialist Advanced Leader Course (ALC) and the 3-week CA Specialist Senior Leader Course (SLC) in residence. Enlisted soldiers transferring into the CA branch from another military occupational specialty (MOS) attend a 4-week CA Specialist MOS Training Course, and later in their careers, they attend the 3-week CA Specialist ALC and the 3-week CA Specialist SLC.
Regardless of the time spent in residence at institutional programs, all CA courses cover each of the CA core competencies, CA missions, mission planning, and targeting for tactical operations. The main difference is that the AC courses focus on executing these tasks with special operations units, while the RC courses focus on working with conventional units. Additionally, the AC training programs include airborne training, language training, and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training that are not required by the RC training program.
Individual and collective training at CA units also differ. Due to many factors, the five AC CA battalions (SO)(A) and one CA brigade headquarters (SO)(A) do not spend as much time each year training on individual, team, company, battalion, and brigade CA tasks in standard cycles as, for example, each of the three Ranger battalions and Ranger Regimental headquarters do for Ranger tasks. They do, however, have more opportunities each year to study their areas of operation at home station, conduct mission planning, take language refresher training, travel to their focus theaters for geographic combatant command (GCC) or theater special operations command (TSOC) exercises, including Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events using 10 USC 322 funds, and attend specialized training at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and other institutions than their RC counterparts.
RC CA Soldiers and units are generally limited to twelve monthly drill weekends (16 hours each) per year and one two-week annual training (AT) event. Because of the many administrative and mandatory training tasks that every Army unit must complete each year, drill weekends are not solely dedicated to practicing CA skills. Instead, this usually happens during unit-level AT. There are exceptions when individuals or small units (usually company-sized) can spend up to 29 days on active duty orders to attend schools, such as the 3-week CA courses mentioned earlier, or to support other collective training events like maneuver brigade-level combat training center (CTC) rotations, corps and division warfighter exercises (WFXs), or theater-level exercises. Some training exercises require rotations of teams at two- or three-week intervals to keep CA coverage for longer events. However, RC units are less flexible than their AC counterparts when responding to short-notice training support requests. Planning for training events must start at least 6-12 months in advance of a fiscal year so each unit can develop its training plan and secure funding.
What do I say?
Now that we’ve examined the differences and similarities between AC and USAR CA forces, I will restate MAJ McElligott’s question in another way: Given the proper authorities, do you believe USAR CA units can perform missions currently assigned to SOF CA units? My brief answer is: It depends on the mission and the deliberate use of available authorities.
Before all USAR CA forces were transferred from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) back to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) in 2006, all CA forces assigned to USASOC were designated as SOF. The AC 96th CA Bn (A) was tasked with supporting both the lengthy and short-notice CA requirements of Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and their Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). In other words, it supported both conventional and special operations missions. There were also four USAR units called CA Battalion (Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare) (CA Bn (FID/UW)) – later redesignated as CA Battalion (Special Operations) (CA Bn (SO)) – that were specifically organized, manned, trained, and equipped to support Special Forces and Ranger units. In fact, some of the soldiers in the CA Bns (FID/UW) were SF- and Ranger-qualified and had previously served in the USAR’s 11th and 12th Special Forces Groups, which were inactivated in 1994.
Today, all USAR CA battalions are organized as tactical CA battalions and are no longer designated as SOF. However, as reflected in current CA doctrine and training programs, all CA forces perform the same core competencies, missions, mission planning, and targeting for tactical-level operations. There are times when this capability is all that is needed to carry out “traditional” SOF CA missions, as we’ll see in the following paragraphs.
The Civil-Military Engagement (CME) Program.
A program executed solely by SOF CA teams in priority countries of interest to USSOCOM is best understood through excerpts from two articles. The first, from the Summer 2013 issue of InterAgency Journal, written by a former member of the 96th CA Bn (SO)(A), states, “The CME program is a U.S. Special Operations Command program of record that ‘facilitates the U.S. interagency, host nation indigenous interagency authorities, select intergovernmental and nongovernmental partners, and the private sector to build, replace, repair, and sustain civil capabilities and capacities that eliminate, reduce, or mitigate civil vulnerabilities to local and regional populations.’ The intent of the CME program is ‘to eliminate the underlying conditions and core motivations for local and regional population support to violent extremist organizations and their networks.’” (Bold font is mine for emphasis.) The second excerpt, from the March-April 2016 issue of Military Review, written by the current commander of the 95th CA Bde (SO)(A), states that “The CME program can use humanitarian assistance to gain access into ungoverned areas, while potentially providing presence and situational awareness. It can also enhance the unity of effort among Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) activities in support of unified land operations. However, the greatest value of the CME program is its ability to spearhead local governance into targeted, undergoverned regions of interest to the commander, addressing the governance conditions that allow threats to thrive.”
The myth of service in the USAR.
In my experience, the idea that “Reservists only work one weekend a month and two weeks a year” is a myth. I have always seen membership in the USAR as a full-time, part-time job, especially for leaders. Besides working eight or more hours daily in their civilian careers, most reservists who take their military roles and unit missions seriously stay up to date on events and conditions in their target AOR and study languages on their own time. They spend many unpaid evenings and weekends preparing themselves and their Soldiers for upcoming training events, working on non-resident course requirements, writing evaluations and awards, and handling other leader tasks that their AC counterparts typically do during regular duty hours. They conduct a pre-deployment validation event, just like AC units do during a readiness cycle. The only difference is that this event usually occurs in a post-mobilization status, which is why USAR CA units are generally not ready for immediate-response missions. However, based on my observations across several named operations, once deployed, they can be just as effective, and sometimes more so, at their assigned missions as any AC CA unit.
A typical USAR CA Team OCONUS mission of yesteryear.
In 1996, my unit – the 354th CA Bde – sent three USAR CA officers on an overseas deployment for training (ODT) mission to Egypt to support an active-duty U.S. Air Force Red Horse Squadron building an airfield for an upcoming Bright Star exercise. Upon arrival, they learned that the squadron’s equipment was being held at the port by local authorities for reasons we would consider illegal. The native Arabic-speaking member of the CA team – a man in his mid-40s with several similar deployments and established networks – engaged his contacts and quickly secured the equipment’s release. Another team member, a supervisory engineer working for a road construction company in the national capital region, assisted by his Arab-American teammate and another network, located a quarry with the right kind of gravel for the airfield’s construction. They negotiated a better price than the squadron had expected to pay. The squadron commander arrived a few days into their three-week tour and learned that the attached individuals were driving freely around the countryside in what he considered a risky environment. Concerned about the risk, he chose to surrender the value the team added to his mission and released them from his control. For the rest of their tour, they supported the U.S. Embassy by reviewing and updating national-level emergency management plans – a task often assigned to AC CA teams.
Typical USAR CA Team OCONUS missions of today.
USAR CA forces conduct missions for GCCs that closely resemble USSOCOM’s CME program. While not official programs like USSOCOM’s CME, they utilize funds available to the theater when planned ahead of time. According to a redacted, declassified DoD Inspector General report published on 31 March 2021, “Since 2011, USSOUTHCOM has used the Civil Affairs Persistent Engagement (CAPE) initiative to support its Civil Military Engagement program. The initiative employs U.S. Army and United States Marine Corps (USMC) Active and Reserve civil affairs forces to support USSOUTHCOM’s Security Cooperation mission. Through the use of section 12304b, title 10, United States Code, Army and USMC Reserve Civil Affairs forces are mobilized and deployed between 6 and 9 months to partner nations primarily to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador-to conduct Civil Affair (sic) operations.”
These USAR and USMC CA units are frequently used to support the mission of Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo in Central America. According to an article about a recent deployment of the 402nd CA Bn stationed in Puerto Rico, “They will be stationed across four countries within U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility, ensuring a consistent presence in the region, working to understand local challenges, foster relationships with communities and partner nations, and provide assistance through the Humanitarian Assistance Program and other means.”
Meanwhile, in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, Task Force Oceania, led by the 322nd CA Bde under the 9th Mission Support Command, carried out an important theater mission from May 2020 to April 2021. Its primary goal was to support the U.S. National Defense Strategy by building partner capacity and countering competitor influence across the island nations of Oceania. The multi-component force, consisting of AC, USAR, and ARNG Soldiers, operated through small, forward-deployed units called Pacific Augmentation Teams (PATs) that lived and worked in several host countries. These teams performed various activities, including medical and disaster response training, while directly supporting U.S. Embassies. Despite significant logistical challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the task force adapted by using remote engagements and strict safety protocols to ensure the mission’s success. This approach leveraged regional expertise and a consistent presence to build trust and establish a lasting U.S. footprint. Ultimately, the mission successfully reinforced regional alliances, enhanced host-nation capabilities, and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Returning to the original question.
So, back to MAJ McElligott’s original question: Do you think the SOF CA units today need to remain SOF to accomplish their assigned missions? The answer is that, to take advantage of Title 10 USC 322 authority and the USSOCOM CME program of record, CA units must be SOF. However, it is my considered opinion that CA units do not need to be AC to be SOF.
Questions for our teammates: How would you respond to MAJ McElligott’s question? Do you believe that only AC forces can be SOF? If so, why?
Responses from Teammates:
11 Dec 2025, MAJ John McElligott: Many thanks to COL (ret) Dennis Cahill for sharing an excellent response to my questions. It is incredibly helpful to receive his mix of government documentation with personal insight into applying authorities and doctrine to force management.
Since COL Cahill confirmed the missions, per doctrine, are the same across active and reserve component forces, we can eliminate that piece of the puzzle. It seems to come down to the authorities. In my opinion, as long as a commander feels confident forces are adequately manned, trained, and equipped to deliver the effects needed, then he or she could task either AC or RC forces to accomplish the mission. I know this happens and that AC units must reclama missions given the downsizing underway with the Army Transformation Initiative. I think it’s helpful for CA to consider how to mix and match forces to fit a range of missions and deliver what’s needed. For example, I think the opinions COL Cahill shared lends to using RC forces for AC missions like regionally aligned CMSE rotations. Of course, the rub is whether RC CATs would truly be available. With sufficient lead time, I’m more confident RC forces could fill those missions than we usually expect.
Send a note to the Civil Affairs Team Room.
Subscribe for updates to the Civil Affairs Team Room Blog
Don’t forget to check out our affiliated sites
LC38 Brand
Aerial Resupply Coffee
