By COL (R) Patrick Pascall
7-minute read
My background.
I was commissioned into Armor in 1993, commanding Abrams M1A1 tanks and learning the fundamentals of maneuver warfare. Three years later, in 1996, I transitioned to Civil Affairs (CA) after a briefing at Fort Knox opened my eyes to the mission’s impact. That decision changed the course of my military career.
Over the next two decades, I had the privilege to plan and participate in many of the U.S. military’s major operations: the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti and Operation Uphold Democracy (1997), Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (2001-2002), Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2004), Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa (2006), Operation Unified Response in Haiti (2010), Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya (2011), and service as the G3/5/7 at U.S. Army Pacific (2017-2019).
Each operation carried its own set of challenges, opportunities, and lessons. Collectively, they shaped my understanding of how critical early integration, trained planners, and strategic patience are to effective civil-military operations.
Challenges.
1. Limited Understanding of Civil Affairs Integration. One of the most consistent challenges throughout my career was that many commanders and planners did not fully understand or appreciate Civil Affairs planning requirements. During my deployments to Afghanistan in 2001-2002 and Iraq in 2003-2004, it was evident that most operational plans lacked adequate pre-invasion consideration for CA operations.
CA must be included in all phases of planning – from Phase 0 (Shape) through Phase 5 (Enable Civil Authority). Unfortunately, many commanders viewed CA activities as peripheral or as “Phase IV and V problems.” Once major combat operations (Phase III – Dominate) ended, planners often found themselves unprepared for the stabilization and governance efforts that followed.
The absence of deliberate planning for these phases led to predictable problems: widespread looting, governance vacuums, and conditions that allowed insurgencies to grow. The lesson was clear – failure to integrate Civil Affairs early and continuously carries strategic consequences long after the shooting stops.
2. Early Haiti Operations (1996-1997). My first exposure to these challenges came during operations in Haiti. What began as a potential combat deployment quickly evolved into peacekeeping and nation-building with a relatively small U.S. footprint of about 10,000 troops.
At the time, I was a young lieutenant and not yet formally trained in planning. I relied on field experience to contribute to our mission. Despite limited resources and doctrinal guidance, our teams – primarily from the 450th and 96th Civil Affairs Battalions – improvised effectively.
That experience taught me two things: first, that success in CA depends on adaptability and relationships; and second, that structured planning education, which I would later receive at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), transforms intuition into strategy.
3. Misaligned Measures of Effectiveness. By 2006, as a planner with Special Operations Command–Central (SOCCENT), I saw a recurring issue: units and their commanders often measured CA success in dollars spent, not outcomes achieved.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, teams were being judged by the amount of money they pushed into local projects. The more money spent, the more successful they appeared – even when that spending distorted local economies and eroded trust.
In contrast, during our assessments in the Horn of Africa, CA teams focused more on visibility and engagement through medical and veterinary operations (MEDCAP/VETCAP). Still, the broader command remained fixated on kinetic operations, leaving non-kinetic effects underappreciated.
This revealed a broader institutional misunderstanding: Civil Affairs is not about projects – it’s about influence, legitimacy, and long-term stability.
Successes.
1. Afghanistan, 2001-2002. As a CA Team Leader during the first rotation into Afghanistan, I worked closely with Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFOD-A) teams under Combined Joint Task Force-180. Despite limited guidance and understanding from higher headquarters, we achieved early successes by building relationships with local leaders and the Northern Alliance.
Our missions complemented Special Forces operations while avoiding overlap. However, as the mission expanded to include Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), unrealistic expectations emerged. Staffs began assigning unqualified personnel – often Navy or Air Force – to roles that required CA expertise. The result was well-intentioned but poorly aligned efforts.
This experience reinforced for me that structure and specialization matter. The right people, properly trained and integrated early, make all the difference.
2. Iraq, 2003-2004. In Iraq, we applied those lessons immediately. Once combat operations concluded, we began developing Neighborhood Advisory Councils (NACs) and District Advisory Councils (DACs) to connect coalition forces with local leadership.
Initially, these councils were contentious. Geographic boundaries established by higher headquarters often ignored clan, religious, and political realities on the ground. Through persistent engagement and trust-building, however, we gained legitimacy. As higher-level planners observed our progress, they began to integrate CA considerations more seriously into operational planning.
Those grassroots efforts demonstrated the power of local governance structures – a bottom-up approach to stability that remains one of CA’s enduring strengths.
3. Operation Unified Response, Haiti (2010). The 2010 Haiti earthquake tested everything I had learned. As a recent graduate of SAMS, I deployed within 24 hours as the lead planner for the XVIII Airborne Corps’ Joint Task Force.
The scale of devastation was staggering: roads, airports, and ports were crippled. Initially, naval assets like the USS Carl Vinson, USS Bataan (with the 22nd MEU), and the hospital ship USNS Comfort provided the only viable operating platforms. My role was to coordinate among the U.S. military, the embassy, the United Nations, and over 8,000 NGOs, IOs, and PVOs.
Success hinged on communication and synchronization. I spent much of my time bridging the gaps between military planners, diplomats, and humanitarian actors — ensuring we all used the same language and worked toward the same objectives. Having the Commander’s trust, the embassy’s confidence, and the UN’s cooperation was crucial.
That operation remains one of the most rewarding experiences of my career. It proved that effective planning is not about control; it’s about coordination, clarity, and credibility.
4. Operation Odyssey Dawn, Libya (2011). Planning for Odyssey Dawn posed a different kind of challenge. Responsibility for the mission had just shifted from U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), creating confusion and gaps in institutional knowledge.
As a planner with the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), I saw firsthand how stove-piped planning limited effectiveness. AFRICOM’s “non-lethal” planning cell had minimal CA experience, and guidance from Washington seemed to evolve live on CNN.
Despite these obstacles, our team rebuilt planning structures, clarified authorities, and established essential coordination with coalition and interagency partners. It reinforced for me that in any operation, relationships and communication channels must be built before the crisis – not during it.
Lessons and Opportunities.
Across all these experiences, one truth stood out: civil considerations are never secondary. When commanders and planners neglect the civil domain, they create vulnerabilities that adversaries exploit later.
To address this, two enduring requirements must be met:
- Trained Civil Affairs Planners: We must invest in CA officers who receive advanced planning education through institutions like SAMS, the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), or the U.S. Army War College’s Basic Strategic Art Program (BSAP). Education transforms experience into foresight. It equips CA officers to articulate the operational value of governance, legitimacy, and human networks.
- Integration at Every Level: Experienced CA planners must be embedded in every echelon – from tactical to strategic – and involved from the earliest phases of planning. Too often, Civil Affairs is brought in after the plan is written, when shaping the environment is already impossible.
My experience reviewing Afghanistan and Iraq planning documents confirmed this pattern repeatedly: late CA integration leads to reactive rather than proactive engagement.
Conclusion.
From Haiti to Libya and beyond, I have seen how Civil Affairs can shape outcomes far beyond what kinetic operations alone can achieve. Our success as a military force depends not only on our ability to dominate an adversary but also on our capacity to legitimize the peace that follows.
The future of Civil Affairs lies in early integration, professional education, and strategic persistence. If we invest in trained planners, empower them at all levels, and view stability as an operational objective rather than an afterthought, we can bridge the enduring divide between combat operations and enduring peace.
Question for our teammates: If you’ve been a CA planner at any echelon for training or operations, what were the challenges, successes, and lessons of your experience?
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COL(R) Patrick Pascall
Colonel (Ret.) Patrick Pascall served in key civil affairs leadership and planning roles across multiple theaters – including Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Unified Response, and Odyssey Dawn – in a distinguished career that spanned more than three decades. A graduate of the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the Army War College Strategist program, and the Naval War College, he was instrumental in pioneering governance and humanitarian frameworks in Afghanistan and Iraq, including the first Provincial Reconstruction Team and Neighborhood Advisory Councils. COL Pascall holds a Master of Arts in National Security Studies and a Master of Arts in Military Operations.